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I. INTRODUCTION
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) are in the business of providing credit ratings 
for a varied number of securities and other debt-related instruments.1  Theoretical-
ly, the purpose of CRAs is to help the investor public with the problematic aspects 
of principal-agent and asymmetric information by providing an easily understanda-
ble reference on a particular financial product’s likelihood of default, thus assisting 
in setting a market price for the product in question.2
In the years leading up to the “credit crisis,”3 CRAs strayed from their original 
purpose and began to play the role of facilitators, enabling investment banks and 
other financial institutions to more easily market structured products and to dis-
guise the high level of risk associated with these products.  Without a rating from 
one of the privileged CRAs, any given offering was doomed to failure.4  Although, 
traditionally, regulators had seen CRAs as “gatekeepers,” in the recent past, they 
have done more to allow financial products to access the market rather than keep-
ing high-risk, or so-called “toxic products,” out of the market.5
As the real estate bubble grew over the past years, major U.S. CRAs saw their 
revenues double, from $3 billion in 2002 to $6 billion in 2007.6  These revenues are 
staggering when compared to the losses CRAs have assisted in generating.  As of 
August 2008, over $500 billion in losses relating to mortgage-based assets had 
been reported, primarily by major international banks.  In addition to commercial 
 ________________________  
 1. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, S. 3850, 109th Cong. (2006) (enacted), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s3850enr.txt.pdf  (A CRA is 
defined as a person “A) engaged in the business of issuing credit ratings on the Internet or through another readily 
accessible means, for free or for a reasonable fee, but does not include a commercial credit reporting company; B) 
employing either a quantitative or qualitative model, or both, to determine credit ratings; and C) receiving fees 
from either issuers, investors, or other market participants, or a combination thereof.”).
 2. Giles Turner, CRA’s: A. Andersen All over Again, http://gsl.tv/blog/giles-turner7/cras-andersen-all-
over-again. 
 3. BBC News, Timeline: Global Credit Crisis, Mar. 18, 2009, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7521250.stm  (In August 2008 BNP Paribas S.A. was forced to stop withdraw-
als from three investment funds because of their exposure to the U.S. subprime market.  These funds were subse-
quently closed due to the bank’s inability to properly value the underlying U.S. assets. This caused a sharp rise in 
the cost of credit and, by most accounts, the start of the “credit crisis.”). 
 4. David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in 
the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (2006). 
 5. See Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in
FINANCIAL GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59 (Barry Bosworth & Robert Litan eds., Brookings 
Inst. Press 2006). 
 6. Fitch Ratings (“Fitch”), Moody’s Investor Services, Inc. (“Moody’s”), and Standard & Poors’ Ratings 
Services (“S&P”). 
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banks, the largest exposures to the U.S. subprime market are held by insurance 
companies and hedge funds, and greater losses and write-downs can be expected.7
Due to a number of circumstances to be analyzed in this paper, the fundamen-
tal role assigned to CRAs by market participants and regulators has been left in the 
hands of three rating institutions.  These CRAs have been able to gain a de facto 
regulatory oligopoly and have captured a 95% market share of the global ratings 
business.8  This factor, together with others, may have contributed to a situation 
where some investors inappropriately relied on CRA ratings as their sole method of 
assessing the risk of holding these types of securities.  Consequently, when the 
quality of the CRAs’ ratings was questioned due to the inordinate number of 
downgrades of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs), some investors were left with no independent means of 
assessing the risk of these securities,9 ultimately resulting in market failure. 
In the present analysis, the role the CRAs played in developing markets for 
certain types of asset-backed securities will be reviewed in order to identify how 
the CRAs promoted the leverage build up that occurred over the past 15 years.  In 
doing so, the fundamental flaws in the ratings process will be highlighted, with a 
view toward being able to assign responsibility accordingly.  Further, the motiva-
tions of banks, financial institutions, and corporate issuers in relying on the CRAs 
will be critiqued.  
Additionally, the principal past and current in-court claims against the CRAs 
will be analyzed and hypotheses will be drawn on the liability that may await the 
CRAs for their involvement in assisting the credit crisis.  Finally, several proposals 
for legislative reform will be suggested and conclusions will be offered on the fu-
ture role CRAs may be expected to play. 
II. STRUCTURED FINANCE AND THE CREDIT CRISIS
A. Background 
On October 9, 2007, the Dow Jones Industrial Average reached an all-time 
high.10  However, not all was well. The 15-year period leading up to the credit cri-
 ________________________  
 7. Andrew Ross Sorkin, If Goldman Returns Aid, Will Others?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/banking-budgeting/article/106793/If-Goldman-Returns-Aid-Will-
Others??sec=topStories&pos=7&asset=TBD&ccode=TBD (“We see another $1.5 to $2 trillion of as yet unrecog-
nized losses from U.S. assets still to hit global financial sector balance sheets and challenge its institutions.”). 
 8. The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Structured Finance Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Entities of the  H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 137 (2007) 
(statements of Julia Whitehead and Sean Mathis), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/19960167/THE-
ROLE-OF-CREDIT-RATING-AGENCIES-IN-THE-STRUCTURED-FINANCE-MARKET-House-
Congressional-Hearing-110th-Congress-2007-200 [hereinafter Whitehead] (This market share is divided as fol-
lows: Moody’s 39%, S&P 40%, Fitch 16%.).
 9. Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, The Role of Credit 
Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets, Final Report (May 2008), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD270.pdf. 
 10. Dow Jones Industrial Average Historical Quote, available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/index/INDU/historical (On Oct. 9, 2007, the Dow peaked at 14,165). 
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sis saw substantial changes in the ways commercial mortgage loans were origi-
nated and held.  
Securitization, which traditionally has been defined as the “aggregation and 
pooling of assets with similar characteristics in such a way that investors may pur-
chase interests or securities backed by those assets,”11 grew from a limited specia-
lized structured finance technique into the principal way in which term loans were 
originated and commercialized.  With the objective of maximizing profits, lenders 
joined together in order to create larger loan offerings than they would have been 
able to originate on their own.  They then targeted specific investors with particula-
rized appetites for certain types of risk.12
Loan packages were split into components with varying priorities and differing 
terms, with certain components destined for securitized pools and other compo-
nents destined for direct sales.13  Further, interests in the securitized pools were 
carved into tranches each with varying degrees of priority.  Many of the ultimate 
purchasers of these tranched interests barely glanced at the underlying real estate 
and rather sought comfort solely from the ratings assigned by the CRAs to each 
tranch.14
Most of the so-called “asset-backed securities” traded in the market were is-
sued in the form of either residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), collate-
ralized debt obligations (CDOs), or asset backed securities (ABS).15  The principal 
instruments to be analyzed in this paper are the first two.16
B. RMBS 
The process for creating a RMBS typically began when an arranger, most fre-
quently an investment bank, packaged mortgage loans into a pool and transferred 
them to a trust that would in turn issue securities collateralized by the pool.  The 
trust would serve as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that would be remote from 
bankruptcy.17  Also, by detaching the assets from the principal business of the issu-
er, the instruments became highly fungible.18  The trust would purchase the loan 
pool and would finance the purchase by issuing RMBS.  The monthly interest and 
 ________________________  
 11. Securitization: Asset-Backed and Mortgage-Backed Securities § 1.01, at 1-3 (Ronald S. Borod ed., 
2003). 
 12. See generally Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L.
REV. 101 (1997). 
 13. Warren Bernstein, Sales of Whole Loans and Fractional Interests Loans, in Commercial Real Estate 
Financing 2009: How the World Changed, Feb. 12-13, 2009, PLI Order No. 18111, 299, 301 (Feb. 12-13, 2009). 
14. Id.
 15. Dennis Vink & André E. Thibeault, ABS, MBS and CDO Compared: An Empirical Analysis (Aug. 
2007), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/Publications/Vink_ABSMBSCDO.pdf [hereinafter Vink & 
Thibeault, Empirical Analysis]. 
 16. RMBS and CDOs are the instruments that have come under particular scrutiny, with respect to the 
assignment of ratings by the CRAs, by the SEC in past months.  See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), Summary Report of the Issues Identified in the Commission Staff´s Examination of Select Credit Rating 
Agencies, July 2008, available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf [hereinafter SEC 
Report July 2008]. 
 17. Vink & Thibeault, Empirical Analysis, supra note 15. 
 18. Id.
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principal payments from the loan pool would then be used to make monthly inter-
est and principal payments to the investors in the RMBS. 
The trust would issue different classes of RMBS or tranches offering varying 
scales of payments to investors based on the level of credit protection.  The degree 
of credit protection, known as forms of “credit enhancement,” was provided pri-
marily by the use of subordination (creating a hierarchy among the tranched securi-
ties), over-collateralization (creating an equity cushion below the lowest tranched 
security to absorb losses), excess spread (by accumulating excess spread that is 
comprised of the total amount by which the total interest received on the underly-
ing loans exceeds the payments to be made to the investors in the trust, less the 
administrative expenses of running the trust)19 and, in some cases, bond insurance 
(insurance provided by a third party).  
C. CDOs 
The CDO began from a similar base as the RMBS, although the CDOs normal-
ly were backed by debt securities rather than mortgage loans, which traditionally 
underlie the RMBS.  Typically, however, the administrators of the CDO actively 
managed the underlying assets and were able to change the assets over time.  Un-
der an RMBS, on the other hand, the mortgage loan pool remained static over time.  
CDOs currently exist in the market in one of two forms.  The first is the so-called 
“Cash Flow CDO” where the trust issues different tranches of liabilities and uses 
the net proceeds to purchase the pool of assets. 20  Normally a sponsor began by 
creating a trust to hold the CDO’s assets and to issue its securities.  Generally, a 
CDO was comprised of 200 or more debt securities.21  The trust was structured to 
provide differing levels of credit enhancement to the securities it issued.  Initially, 
in the early 1980’s and 1990’s, CDOs were backed by high-yield corporate 
bonds,22 but in recent years CDOs became one of the largest purchasers of “sub-
prime” RMBS and the drivers of demand for those securities.23  In fact, the rapid 
 ________________________  
 19. SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 20. Standard & Poor´s, Structured Finance: Global Cash Flow and Synthetic CDO Criteria, Mar. 21, 
2002, available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/cdo_criteria2002_FINALTOC.pdf 
[hereinafter Standard & Poor’s, Global Cash Flow]. 
 21. Id. at 42. 
 22. Standard & Poor´s, Global Cash Flow, supra note 20.  
 23. See Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud. of Harvard Univ., The State of the Nation’s Housing 2005, at 1, 5 (2005), 
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/markets/son2005/son2005.pdf  (“Subprime” lending also 
had seen significant growth, reaching nearly 20% of all originations in 2004.  Subprime lending is the extension of 
credit to those with lower incomes, less wealth, and riskier credit profiles than traditional, “prime” borrowers.  
Although it would appear that the increase in subprime lending may have contributed to the crisis, there are those 
who would refute this claim.  Nevertheless, although not a key element of the present analysis, we merely high-
light the growth in the practice of subprime loan origination and refinancing.); see Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, 
Stamp Lecture at the London School of Economics, London, England (Jan. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm (“The proximate cause of the crisis 
was the turn of the housing cycle in the United States and the associated rise in delinquencies on subprime mort-
gages, which imposed substantial losses on many financial institutions and shook investor confidence in the credit 
markets.  However, although the subprime debacle triggered the crisis, the developments in the U.S. mortgage 
market were only one aspect of a much larger and more encompassing credit boom, the impact of which tran-
scended the mortgage market and affected adversely many other forms of credit.”).
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increase in subprime RMBS held by CDOs from the early 2000s through 2006 has 
been well documented.24  The so-called “Synthetic CDOs” are the riskiest form of 
CDO.  These are structured vehicles that use credit derivatives to achieve the same 
credit-risk transfer as “Cash Flow CDOs,” but without the physical transfer of the 
assets.25  One of the most common forms of derivatives used, and which has been 
most lethal to the financial system during the present crisis, was the credit default 
swap.26  In those cases, rather than purchasing subprime RMBS or CDOs, the ar-
ranger or trust manager entered into credit default swaps referencing subprime 
RMBS or CDOs.  The particular importance of Synthetic CDOs and so-called 
“Hybrid CDOs”27 to banks and other institutions with respect to meeting regulatory 
and risk-based capital considerations will be discussed infra in Section IV.d. 
D. Structured Finance and the CRAs 
Historically, banks have played the role of credit monitors in the market be-
cause they had access to the debtor’s financial information.  But today the agencies 
face pressures that did not exist when John Moody was rating railroads.  In the 
modern era of structured finance, it appeared that banks or issuers no longer had 
the desire to monitor and evaluate the risks being issued to potential investors.  
Professor Schwarcz has hypothesized that the new “originate and distribute” model 
(which encapsulates the broader “issuer pays” concept) of RMBS and CDOs, faci-
litated by structured finance techniques, undermined the incentive that the banks, 
financial institutions, and investors usually had in the past to monitor their invest-
ments over time.28  Furthermore, structured finance models used during the past 
years may have created formidable complexities in the required disclosures, en-
couraged herd behavior, and created excessive diversification of risk, all of which 
would have undermined the traditional incentive to monitor.29  If the last proposi-
tions are correct, then investors and issuers would have had to rely on a third party 
to evaluate the initial risk and to conduct monitoring.  
In this respect CRAs provided a bridge between the issuers and the investors.  
The CRAs theoretically would provide an unbiased opinion on the basis of infor-
mation that was made available to them, albeit provided directly to them by the 
 ________________________  
 24. See Jian Hu, Assessing the Credit Risk of CDOs Backed by Structured Finance Securities: Rating 
Analysts’ Challenges and Solutions, THE J. OF STRUCTURED FIN., Aug. 31, 2007, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1011184 (It has been reported that the average percentage of 
subprime RMBS in the collateral pools of CDOs in some cases grew by nearly 30% from 2003 through 2006.). 
 25. Frank Partnoy & David Skeel, The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019 
(2007).  See also Standard & Poor´s, Global Cash Flow, supra note 20 (Note that the CDOs can be composed 
entirely of credit default swaps in which case they will be properly deemed “Synthetic CDOs” or they can be a 
combination of credit default swaps and cash RMBS, in which case they would more appropriately be called 
“Hybrid CDOs.”).
 26. See Abigail Moses, CDO Losses Driving Credit-Default Swaps to Record, Analysts Say, Feb. 11, 2008,
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agyv_xzB1tIg.
 27. Usually the trust will hold both RMBS and certain types of derivatives. 
 28. Steven Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons From the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 373, 388 (2008). 
 29. Id.
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issuers.30  Indeed, a key step in creating and selling RMBS and CDOs was the is-
suance of a credit rating containing the agency’s view of the likelihood that the 
issuer would default on its obligations to pay interest for each of the tranches is-
sued by the trust.31
E. A Common Procedure 
According to internal procedures at three of the largest CRAs, the common 
practice among credit rating agencies was for the arranger or issuer of the RMBS 
or the CDOs to initiate the ratings process by sending to the CRA a range of data 
on each of the subprime loans to be held by the trust, the proposed capital structure, 
and the proposed levels of credit enhancement.32  Upon receipt of the information, 
the CRA assigned a lead analyst who was responsible for analyzing the loan pool 
and the underlying assets. 33
Eventually, after a series of quantitative loss models, stress tests and cash flow 
models were run, the analyst would create a ratings recommendation for a rating 
committee composed of analysts and senior level analytical personnel.34  However, 
if the analyst concluded that the proposed capital structure did not support the de-
sired ratings by the issuer, then a preliminary conclusion was delivered to the ar-
ranger.  The arranger could then accept that determination or adjust the structure to 
provide for a higher rating.35  The CRA would then issue a rating decision (which 
in some cases could be appealed by the arranger).  Typically, the CRA was paid 
only if the credit rating was issued, although on occasion there was a fee for the 
analytical work conducted in the event the arranger did not go forward with the 
issue.36
III. WHAT WENT WRONG? IDENTIFYING THE FLAWS
With the help of the CRAs, the issuers were able to design structures that 
would ensure a triple-A rating and, hence, would meet institutional investor crite-
 ________________________  
 30. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16 (Since the 1970’s the clients of the CRAs have primarily 
become the issuers and not the investors.  Usually the investor pool is too dispersed to make it worthwhile to pay 
for independent credit rating analysis.  This point will be further analyzed later in this paper.  The SEC has now 
proposed that the CRAs take steps to deal with the “issuer pays” conflicts of interest.).
 31. See VK BHALLA, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT: SECURITY ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
143 (S. Chand & Co. Ltd 1994). 
 32. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16 (Note that as CDOs are actively managed, the rating does not 
depend so much on the composition of the pool of debt securities, but rather on the covenants that limit the man-
agement of the CDO.). 
 33. The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Code of Con-
duct Fundamental for Credit Rating Agencies, Dec. 2004, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD180.pdf [hereinafter Code of Conduct]. 
 34. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit-
Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619 (1999) (S&Ps procedures are almost identical to the ones described here, 
but allow for the analyst recommendation that is overruled to be protested before an internal appeals court.). 
 35. SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16.  
 36. Id.
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ria.37  The tranches were constructed to achieve this rating at the least expense.  
Ironically, today many triple-A tranches now have the greatest exposure to sub-
prime mortgages.38  Unfortunately, it would appear that the procedures outlined 
above were wholly unsatisfactory.  Many ratings issued on RMBS and CDOs 
turned out to be self-serving, allowing market participants to earn profits and 
fees,39 while offering very little reliable information about risks.40
A. Failure to Conduct or Require that Due Diligence be Conducted 
There is no requirement that a CRA verify the information contained in loan 
portfolios presented to them for ratings.  In fact, judging from the typical proce-
dure, as mentioned supra, the CRAs publicly disclose that they receive the infor-
mation from the issuer.  Furthermore, most of the CRAs’ “Code of Conduct” con-
tains information that it is under no obligation to perform due diligence.41  The 
CRAs do not verify the integrity or accuracy of the information received from issu-
ers, and in the view of the CRAs the due diligence duties belong to the other parties 
in the process.  Perhaps worst of all is the fact that CRAs do not usually seek repre-
sentations from the issuers that due diligence was indeed performed.42
Evidently CRAs will most likely never be required to conduct extensive due 
diligence, but it does seem shocking that rating agencies normally charge between 
$40,000 and $120,000 for every $100 million in so-called “structured-finance se-
curities” they rate,43 and yet they conduct no due diligence and require that none be 
conducted.  In this respect, the SEC has recently proposed two additional areas that 
a CRA would be required to address concerning the disclosures it would have to 
provide about how it treats due diligence.44  It remains to be seen whether these 
rules will have the desired effect. 
 ________________________  
 37. As will be seen below in Section V, certain institutions can only invest in products with a particular 
rating. 
 38. Aaron Unterman, Innovative Destruction-Structured Finance and Credit Market Reform in the Bubble 
Era, 5 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 53 (2009). 
 39. The explosive growth in certain structured products helped generate the highest profits for the issuers 
(in the form of commissions) and the CRAs (in the form of fees). 
 40. Unterman, supra note 38, at 53. 
 41. See Moody´s Investor Service, Code of Professional Conduct (June 2005), available at
http://www.moodys.com/moodys/cust/research/MDCdocs/01/2003400000425277.pdf?search=5&searchQuery=co
de+of+conduct&click=1 (“Moody’s has no obligation to perform, and does not perform, due diligence with re-
spect to the accuracy of information it receives or obtains in connection with the rating process.  Moody’s does not 
independently verify any such information.  Nor does Moody’s audit or otherwise undertake to determine that such 
information is complete.  Thus, in assigning a Credit Rating, Moody’s is in no way providing a guarantee or any 
kind of assurance with regard to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of factual information reflected, or 
contained, in the Credit Rating or any related Moody’s publication.”).
 42. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 43. Serena Ng and Liz Rappaport, Raters See Windfall in Bailout Program, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123751980140092361.html. 
 44. See Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34,57967 (June 16, 2008), available at http:www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2008/34-57967.pdf  (The rules 
would require that the CRA indicate how much verification performed on assets underlying or referenced by a 
security or money market instrument issued by an asset pool is relied on in determining credit ratings.). 
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B. Conflicts of Interest Abound 
Under the “issuer pays” model generally in place since the 1970s, the securities 
issuer pays the CRAs to issue ratings which can cause the agencies’ interests to 
eclipse those of investors. 45  Evidently the CRAs have an interest in generating 
business from the underwriting firms, which creates an inherent conflict. 46  To 
make matters worse, investment banks and others seeking higher profits saw tre-
mendous potential in the risky mortgage business since the interest rates on mort-
gage products were higher and more money came into the pool, which would then 
leave more money for commissions, management fees, and for paying interest to 
investors.  For instance, when a bank proposed a rating structure on a pool of mort-
gage debt, the CRA many times would ask that a capital enhancement be provided 
(an extra cushion of capital for certain tranches).  The bank inevitably would lobby 
for a thin cushion (the thinner the capitalization, the larger the bank’s profits). 47
To some degree it was up to the agency to make sure that the cushion was big 
enough to safeguard the investors.  The process involved extended consultations 
between the agency and its client as described supra.  “In short, obtaining a rating 
was a collaborative process.”48  Ultimately, if the CRA and the issuer failed to 
reach an agreement, the issuer could take its business elsewhere.49
Currently, Section 15E(d) of the Exchange Act requires that CRAs establish 
and maintain policies and procedures reasonably designed to address and manage 
conflicts of interest.50  Such policies in turn should have the purpose of ensuring 
that the CRAs’ judgment remains unbiased.51  Furthermore, in December 2004, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a Code 
of Conduct for CRAs that, among other things, is designed to address the types of 
conflicts of interest that CRAs face. 52  This code was fundamentally revised in 
2008. 53
Nevertheless, a recent SEC investigation found a number of internal flaws 
within the CRAs themselves.  In one instance, a CRA allowed senior analytical 
managers to participate directly in fee discussions with the issuers and it was found 
 ________________________  
 45. Gretchen Morgenson, Credit Rating Agency Heads Grilled by Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, 
available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/economy/23rating.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=credit%20rating%20agen
cies&st=cse (statement was made to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform by Jerome S. 
Fons, who was the managing director for credit policy at Moody’s until 2007).
 46. It should be noted that there is a high concentration in the firms conducting the underwriting function 
for most RMBS and CDO deals.  See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 47. Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure: The Rating Game, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1. 
 48. Id.
 49. This practice has been termed “forum shopping” and will be discussed infra.
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(a)(1)(B)(iii). 
 51. See Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies Registered as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organ-
izations, Exchange Act Release No. 34,55857, 17 C.F.R. Parts 240 and 249b (June 5, 2007).  
 52. See Code of Conduct, supra note 33. 
 53. The Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Code of Con-
duct Fundamental for Credit Rating Agencies, May 2008, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf. 
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that only one of the three largest CRAs actively monitors for compliance with its 
internal policy against analysts participating in fee discussions.54  Furthermore, the 
SEC found that multiple communications at CRAs indicated that analysts were 
aware of their firm´s fee arrangement with issuers and held employee discussions 
about their CRA’s market share of business relative to other CRAs.55  Examples of 
suspect communications revealed by the SEC investigation that highlight the prob-
lem are the following: 
A senior analytical manager in the Structured Finance group wrote, 
“I am trying to ascertain whether we can determine at this point if 
we will suffer any loss of business because of our decision of as-
signing separate ratings to principal and interest, and if so how 
much.” 56
When a competitor’s rating methodology changed, a high-level 
employee stated, “I had a discussion with the team leaders here 
and we think that the only way to compete is to have a paradigm 
shift in thinking especially with the interest rate risk.” 57
One final case that serves to illustrate the problem, although from a slightly 
different perspective, is that of Berkshire Hathaway’s triple-A debt rating. 58  In 
March 2009, news surfaced that the company’s debt would be downgraded by S&P 
and Moody’s following Fitch’s earlier move to downgrade.59 Berkshire’s CEO, 
Warren Buffet, typically described as a vocal critic of “Wall Street excesses,” has 
been particularly silent about the possible downgrade and with respect to voicing 
any possible criticism against the CRAs.60  It has been suggested that this may be 
in part due to the fact that Berkshire owns 20% of Moody’s, making Berkshire the 
largest single shareholder.61   In fact, a recently departed Berkshire employee con-
fessed to a reporter that “Mr. Buffett ha[d] long found his connection to Moody’s a 
 ________________________  
 54. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 55. Id.
 56. Id. (quoting e-mail No. 32: Senior Analytical Manager to Senior Business Manager (Nov. 9, 2004, 
12:11pm)). 
 57. SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16 (quoting e-mail No. 34: Senior Analytical Manager to Analytical 
Manager (Sept. 25, 2006, 6:50pm)). 
 58. See Aaron Task, Warren Buffett: The Good, the Bad and the Moody’s, Mar. 25, 2009, available at
http://finance.yahoo.com/techticker/article/219148/Warren-Buffett:-The-Good,-the-Bad-and-the-Moody’s.
 59. An S&P analyst was quoted as having said the following: “If continued substantial deterioration in the 
equity markets hurts capital further, or if it appears that the insurance group will not be able to restore capital back 
to the ‘AAA’ level through earnings or through capital contributions from Berkshire’s noninsurance operations or 
external sources, then we might lower the ratings.”  See Jonathan Stempel, Buffett’s Berkshire May Lose “AAA” 
S&P Rating, REUTERS, Mar. 25, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSTRE52O2S020090325?feedType=RSS&feedName=businessN
ews. 
 60. David Segal, Buffett Is Unusually Silent on Rating Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/business/18buffett.html?pagewanted=1&partner=rss&emc=rss. 
 61. Josh Flunk, Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway Downgraded By Moody’s, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 8, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/wireStory?id=7294808. 
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little awkward . . . Mr. Buffett never attended any board meetings . . . and Berk-
shire has never bought any additional shares.”62
In any event, the conflicts of interest problem is the area that is most easily and 
commonly identified by critics.  Hence, it will be the area most likely to be ad-
dressed first by upcoming regulatory proposals. 
C. Concentration and Oligopoly Power 
In 1975, the SEC promulgated a series of broker-dealer net capital require-
ments, with the thought being that banks and other financial institutions should not 
need to keep in reserve the same amount of capital if the financial institution was 
heavily invested in highly-liquid securities with low levels of risk.63 This is when 
the term “Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization” (NRSRO) first 
came into use.64  At first the SEC granted NRSRO status through No-Action Let-
ters, but on September 29, 2006, the Credit Ratings Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA) 
was approved and the process changed.65  Now the SEC grants the NRSRO status 
after a CRA becomes registered in accordance with Section 15E of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).66  Currently, there are ten NRSROs regis-
tered with the SEC.67  However, of the ten, the largest three CRAs (Moody’s Inves-
tor Services, Standard & Poor’s, Inc. and Fitch, Inc.) collectively comprise approx-
imately 85% of the CRA market.68
The credit ratings industry may be a state-sanctioned global oligopoly.  In 1998 
the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), although opposed to the NRSRO certifica-
tion process then outlined by the SEC, believed that “while the historical domin-
ance of Moody’s and S&P had eroded in recent years for certain types of securities, 
the overall level of market power they retained continued to be a competitive”69
 ________________________  
 62. Id.
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1983); see generally, Steven Molinari & Nelson Kibler, Broker-Dealers’ 
Financial Responsibility Under the Uniform Net Capital Rule – A Case for Liquidity, 72 GEO. L. J. 1 (1983-1984). 
 64. Assessing the Current Oversight and Operations of Credit Rating Agencies: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, S. REP. NO. 109-326 (Mar. 7, 2006), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/partnoy.pdf (testimony of Frank Partnoy). 
 65. See Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA), Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006) 
the Credit Ratings Reform Act of 2006, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s3850enr.txt.pdf. 
 66. It should be noted that the CRARA preempts any state and local law requiring the registration, licens-
ing, or qualification of an NRSRO (or any employee or contractor) as a credit rating agency or an NRSRO.  It 
declares, however, that nothing in this preemption prohibits a state securities commission from investigating and 
bringing an enforcement action with respect to fraud or deceit against any NRSRO or associated person. 
 67. The ten NRSRO’s registered are: A.M. Best Company, Inc.; DBRS Ltd.; Egan-Jones Rating Company; 
Fitch, Inc.; Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd.; LACE Financial Corp.; Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.; Rating and 
Investment Information, Inc.; Realpoint LLC; and Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services.  See SEC, Credit Rating 
Agencies – NRSROs, available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/nrsro.htm (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). 
 68. See Code of Conduct, supra note 33. 
 69. SEC, Report on the Role and Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities 
Markets, Jan. 2003, at 37, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (citing com-
ments of the United States Department of Justice in the Matter of: File No. S7-33-97, 
Proposed Amendments to Rule 15c3-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Mar. 6, 1998)). 
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obstacle.  This remains true today70 and it would seem that impediments to entering 
the market have allowed these leading CRAs to dominate the global ratings indus-
try.71
Although oligopoly power creates a whole series of concerns for the CRA in-
dustry, the most problematic is the systematic overvaluation of securities and debt 
instruments.  This may occur in two ways.  The first is the so-called “grade infla-
tion” hypothesis.  This problem is particularly pronounced when dealing with secu-
ritized products, since it is with these that demand is especially driven by regulated 
intermediaries.72  Indeed, the entire viability of being able to market a RMBS or 
CDO may be seen to rely solely on obtaining a sufficiently high rating.  The second 
is the underestimation of risk and the overvaluation of underlying assets by all 
market players.73  This second phenomenon may well have occurred during the last 
decade when the CRAs were, apparently, overvaluing the price of real estate and 
undervaluing the risk of default. 
D. Failure to Adequately Monitor 
It is a common practice for the CRAs to check their ratings on an ongoing basis 
in a process called “monitoring.”  A recent SEC investigation found that the CRAs 
charge a “monitoring” fee on an annual, upfront basis. 74  The monitoring of struc-
tured products was found to be of particular importance because the due diligence 
information underlying the loan pools was generally not available to independent 
analysts or third parties.75  However, there has been considerable criticism levied 
against the CRAs for their inability to properly monitor ratings and conduct timely 
downgrades on a number of securities and debt instruments.  Commentators have 
suggested that this “lethargy in downgrading” results in the downgrades not being 
issued promptly enough to warn the investor public.76
Although there are multiple examples,77 a case where the failure to monitor 
reached epic proportions occurred immediately before Enron´s collapse in 2001.  
Prior to its demise, Enron’s ability to secure low-cost financing was based on an 
investment grade credit rating (e.g., BBB+ from S&P), which the major CRAs 
 ________________________  
 70. Before the CRARA took effect, the SEC promised to revise the requirements that NRSROs would have 
to meet, but the issue remains controversial.  See id.
 71. See Unterman, supra note 38, at 53. 
 72. Charles W. Calomiris, Not (Yet) a Minsky Moment, AM. ENTER. INST., Oct. 5, 2007, at 18, 
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20071214_Calomiris1.pdf. 
 73. See Steven Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons From the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown,
93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 388 (2008). 
 74. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 75. Id.
 76. Francis Bottini, Jr., An Examination of the Current Status of Rating Agencies and Proposals for 
Limited Oversight of Such Agencies, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 579, 603-08 (1993). 
 77. A much earlier example that was widely criticized was the fact that in 1975 both S&P and Moody’s 
waited too long to change New York City’s bond ratings.  S&P changed its rating in April 1975 and Moody’s 
changed its rating the following October.  However, critics complained that obvious warning signs that existed the 
previous fall should have caused the rating agencies to downgrade the state’s debt rating sooner.  See Bottini, Jr., 
supra note 76. 
12
Barry Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol14/iss1/2
Spring 2010 Triple-A Rating Stench 37
gave to Enron’s debt from 1995 until November 2001.78  The CRAs received in-
formation during this period indicating that Enron was engaging in substantial de-
rivatives and off-balance sheet transactions, including both non-public information 
and information disclosed in Enron’s annual reports, but they maintained an in-
vestment grade rating.79 If Enron’s credit rating had reflected the company’s actual 
debt levels during this period, it would not have been able to leverage such high 
levels of debt and maintain a high stock price at the same time.80  What was most 
astounding was that despite the fact that the CRAs had been aware of the compa-
ny’s off-balance sheet transactions for months, Enron’s rating remained at invest-
ment grade up to four days before the company went bankrupt.  During the after-
math of Enron´s collapse, the CRAs defended themselves, alleging that Enron´s 
management had deceived them into maintaining the high-level ratings.81
During recent times, similar situations have arisen in which the CRAs have is-
sued significant downgrades of RMBS and CDOs.  The amount and speed of 
downgrades being issued since 2008 is unprecedented. 82  Most of the downgrades 
have been attributed to the precipitous drop in housing prices and the increase in 
mortgage delinquencies.83 The following is a summary of the more important 
downgrades announced thus far: 
As of February 2008 Moody’s had downgraded at least one 
tranche of 94.2% of the subprime RMBS issues it rated in 2006, 
including 100% of the 2006 RMBS backed by second-lien loans, 
and 76.9% of the issues rated in 2007. 84   
As of March 2008, S&P had downgraded 44.3% of the subprime 
tranches it rated between the first quarter of 2005 and the third 
quarter of 2007.85
 ________________________  
 78. Rating the Raters: Enron and the Credit Rating Agencies, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Gov’t 
Affairs, 107th Cong. 7-10 (Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Ronald M. Barone, Managing Director, Standard and 
Poor’s), available at http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/072302barone.pdf. 
 79. Frank Partnoy, Lessons from Enron, How Did Corporate And Securities Law Fail?, 48 VILL. L. REV.
1245 (2003). 
 80. Id.
 81. Richard Oppel Jr., Enron´s Many Strands: The Hearings; Credit Agencies Say Enron Dishonesty 
Misled Them, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/21/business/enron-s-
many-strands-hearings-credit-agencies-say-enron-dishonesty-misled-them.html. 
 82. See SEC, Testimony Concerning Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Apr. 22, 2008, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts042208cc.htm. 
 83. See Concerning Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations: Hearing Before 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs (Apr. 22, 2008), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts042208cc.htm (testimony of Christopher Cox). 
 84. Overall, Moody’s has downgraded 53.7% and 39.2% of its 2006 and 2007 subprime tranches, respec-
tively.  SEC, Testimony Concerning Oversight of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Apr. 22, 
2008, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts042208cc.htm (quoting Moody’s Investors Service, 
U.S. Subprime RMBS 2005-2007 Vintage Rating Actions Update: January 2008, Feb. 1, 2008). 
 85. Id. (quoting Standard & Poor’s Rating Services, Transition Study: Structured Finance Rating Transi-
tion and Default Update as of March 21, 2008, Mar. 28, 2008). 
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As of December 2007, Fitch had downgraded approximately 34% 
of the subprime tranches it rated in 2006 and in the first quarter of 
2007, and, in February 2008, Fitch placed all of the RMBS it rated 
in 2006 and the first quarter of 2007 backed by subprime first lien 
mortgages on “Ratings Watch Negative.”86
As a consequence of untimely downgrades, investors have brought claims 
against several of the CRAs alleging that they relied on the ratings and that the 
CRAs failed to duly monitor underlying assets for significant decreases in the qual-
ity of the investments they purchased.  These claims will be further analyzed infra
in Section V. 
E. Lack of Transparency and Failure to Adequately Keep Records 
When Moody´s and S&P rate the same issue their ratings coincide 97% of the 
time.87  Still little information exists about how CRAs conduct their ratings.  CRAs 
have published several volumes explaining how they have reached their results, but 
many details remain highly secretive as this is claimed to be a private, competitive 
business.  
By adding certain sections to the Exchange Act, CRARA requires that CRAs 
file certain information with the SEC.  In particular Sections15E(b)i through 
15E(b)x of the Exchange Act require that the CRAs deliver to the SEC, among 
others, certain statistics, the methodologies used, information concerning the CRAs 
internal code of ethics and, on a confidential basis, a list of the twenty largest issu-
ers (or clients).88  Further, under Section 15E(b), the CRAs have a duty to update 
and amend their registrations.89
Nevertheless, the SEC recently found that several CRAs had not published cri-
teria on rating so-called “Hybrid Deals,” kept no specific guidelines on rating 
RMBS and CDOs, and other CRAs had reduced their model’s raw loss numbers on 
second lien mortgages without disclosing it to the public.90  In some cases, there 
were considerable time lags between the moment the CRA implemented a new 
process and when it announced the change to the public, and some CRAs were 
found to have made out of model adjustments without documenting their ratio-
nale.91
Under Rule 17g-2 of the Exchange Act, CRAs are required to make certain 
records relating to their business and retain other business records.  For instance, 
 ________________________  
 86. Id. (quoting Fitch Ratings, Update on U.S. Subprime and Alt-A: Performance and Rating Reviews,
Mar. 20, 2008). 
 87. Partnoy, supra note 34, at 651-52. 
 88. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 89. Rule 15E(b) requires that “each nationally recognized statistical rating organization shall promptly 
amend its application for registration under this section if any information or document provided therein becomes 
materially inaccurate, except that a nationally recognized statistical rating organization is not required to amend.”  
15 U.S.C. § 78o-7 (2006). 
 90. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 91. See id.
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the rule requires that the identity of any credit analyst who participates in the rating 
process be kept, as well as the identity of persons approving the rating and whether 
the rating was solicited or unsolicited.92  Recently, however, it was found that 
CRAs do not always fully comply with these requirements, making it difficult for 
examiners to assess compliance with internal policies and procedures.93 For in-
stance, a recent SEC examination found that the vote tallies of rating committee 
participants were rarely documented and there were numerous failures to retain 
memos and minutes.94  At one CRA, it was found that approximately a quarter of 
the RMBS deals reviewed lacked an indication of the chairperson’s identity, as 
well as whether a quorum was present at the committee meetings.95
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE MOTIVATIONS TO RELY ON CRAS
A. Banking Regulation and Capital Adequacy Requirements  
The ratings that CRAs issue on a large range of securities held by banks play a 
crucial role in determining the financial soundness of banks and other institutions.  
Under the National Banking Act, for example, a depository institution is deemed 
“well-managed” only if it has been examined by the appropriate federal banking 
agency and has thereafter achieved a certain composite rating.96  In order to con-
duct the review of financial institutions in the U.S., federal regulators apply the 
Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS),97 which was adopted in 
1979 and updated in 1997.98  Its purpose is to evaluate the soundness of financial 
institutions on a uniform basis and identify those institutions requiring special at-
tention or concern.99
One of the elements analyzed under UFIRS (or commonly referred to as 
CAMELS) to determine capital adequacy is “the balance sheet composition, in-
cluding the nature and amount of intangible assets, market risk, concentration risk, 
and risks associated with nontraditional activities.”100  By using Cash Flow CDOs, 
discussed supra, banks and other financial institutions could offload certain assets 
from their balance sheets, such as riskier mortgage loan pools.  
Additionally, a number of banks have been able to “create value” by packaging 
the underlying assets together and obtaining higher ratings for the bundled as-
 ________________________  
 92. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-2(a)(2)(i)-(iii) (2009). 
 93. See SEC Report July 2008, supra note 16. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.
 96. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 24a(g)(6)(A)(i)-(ii) (2009). 
 97. Also known as CAMELS, which stands for the five elements rated under the UFIRS: Capital Adequa-
cy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to Market Risk, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/1996/19961224/default.htm.   
 98. Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 62 Fed. Reg. 752 (Jan. 6, 1997) (effective Jan. 1, 1997), 
available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/UFIR.pdf. 
 99. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 5000 - Statements of Policy – Uniform Financial Institu-
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sets.101  Indeed, it has been suggested that the CRAs may have developed metho-
dologies for rating CDOs that resulted in the combination of tranches being worth 
more than the cost of the underlying assets. 102  In fact, Professor Partnoy, some-
what sarcastically perhaps, said, “the difference between the price investors in ag-
gregate pay for CDO tranches and the cost of the underlying assets must be sub-
stantial because it covers the high fees the various participants charge for structur-
ing and arranging a CDO and for managing the underlying assets.”103  If this is so, 
banks have been able to shore up their balance sheets by holding highly rated 
RMBS and CDOs. 
1. Basel Guidelines 
CRAs have also been granted institutional and governmental recognition in 
aiding to create investment restrictions for banks and financial institutions.  The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision organized by the Bank for International 
Settlements, under Pillar I of Basel II,104 has agreed that CRAs may be deemed 
“External Credit Assessment Institutions.”105  The consequence of this is that it 
allows regulated entities to rely on ratings for the purpose of determining capital 
adequacy requirements, on some occasions replacing the need for the banks to as-
sess the risks themselves.106  Hence, under Basel II, banks may be authorized by 
their domestic regulators to use ratings from certain approved CRAs when calculat-
ing their net capital reserve requirements.107  In fact, this approach had, until re-
cently, been supported since it was believed that relying on the CRAs would pro-
vide greater accuracy than relying on the bank’s internal information that it would 
then provide to the regulators.108
In the European Union (EU) this approach is used today as the Basel recom-
mendations for recognizing external rating agencies and the reliability of external 
ratings have been implemented in Articles 81 to 83 of the Banking Directive.109  In 
the case of CRAs seeking recognition in several EU member states, a joint assess-
ment process is carried out among the EU member states concerned. A central con-
 ________________________  
 101. See Kenneth Kettering, Securitization and its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Devel-
opment, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1568-70 (2008).  The author indicates that CRAs regularly give securitized 
debt a higher rating than secured debt because the securitized debt is believed to be bankruptcy-isolated. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 25, at 1029. 
 104. The major objective of Basel II is to revise the rules of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord in such a way as 
to align banks’ regulatory capital more closely with their risks, taking account of progress in the measurement and 
management of these risks and the opportunities which these provide for strengthened supervision. 
 105. Under the Standardized Approach to credit risk, Basel II establishes credit risk weights for each super-
visory category. 
 106. Walter Schulte-Herbrüggen et. al., Basel II Ratings – Are They Really Comparable?, 121 BANKING L.J. 
430 (2004). 
 107. Bank for International Settlement, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document,
The New Basel Capital Accord, Jan. 2001. 
 108. See, e.g., Nadine Cancell, The New Basel Capital Accord, 856 PLI/COMM 895 (2003). 
 109. See Articles 81 to 83 of the Banking Directive (2006/48/EC), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
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tact and coordinator is appointed within this informal process.110  The joint evalua-
tion and coordination in the joint assessment of the application by all of the super-
visory authorities involved is “intended to ensure that a shared view is reached
across member states while at the same time reducing the bureaucracy involved for 
the applicant.”111 Three international rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch) 
were already assessed in a trial run of the recognition process in 2006.112
2. Securities Laws 
Other examples of reliance on the CRAs are found in the securities laws.  Rule 
2a-7 of the Securities Act allows money market funds113 to hold securities and to 
value the assets of the fund by looking at the cost of acquisition, plus the premium 
or discount due on the security.  The rule differentiates between so-called “first-tier 
securities” and “second-tier securities,” and limits the amount of second-tier securi-
ties that a money market fund can hold.  The first-tier securities are defined as “a 
Rated Security that has received a short-term rating from the Requisite 
NRSROs.”114  The framework provided in Rule 2a-7 has been seen by some to 
constitute a regulatory license “because of Rule 2a-7’s dependence on NRSRO 
ratings, whether a commercial paper issue is classified as first-tier or second-tier 
depends on the ratings assigned to the paper by one or more NRSROs.”115
Also, in the context of private placements of securities, Rule 144A of the 1933 
Securities Act, the SEC has relied on CRAs to make certain determinations.116
Rule 144A exempts from the registration requirements certain offers and re-sales 
of securities of foreign and domestic issuers, provided the sale is to a Qualified 
Institutional Buyer (QIB).117  However, there are obstacles to determining who may 
qualify as a QIB, as certain capital or net worth requirements, among others, have 
to be satisfied. To facilitate this determination, the SEC has declared that sellers 
may rely on a list of QIBs published by S&P.118
Finally, in another example regulators have expressly authorized banks and 
other financial institutions to directly rely on the CRAs.  For instance, under the 
 ________________________  
 110. On January 20, 2006, CEBS published its Guidelines on the recognition of External Credit Assessment 
Institutions (ECAIs) in order to achieve a maximum of consistency in the interpretation of the Directive in this 
regard.  See Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Guidelines on the Recognition of External Credit 
Assessment Institutions (ECAIs), available at
http://www.bundesbank.de/download/bankenaufsicht/pdf/cebs/GL07.pdf. 
 111. Deutsche Bundesbank, Basel II: Standardised Approach for Credit Risk: External Rating, available at 
http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_basel_kreditrisiko.en.php (last visited Feb. 1, 2010). 
 112. Id. 
 113. A money market fund has been described as a mutual fund that mimics the safety and liquidity of a 
bank savings deposit, but without FDIC insurance. 
 114. See Rule 2a-7(a)(12) of the Securities Act of 1933. 
 115. Partnoy, supra note 34, at 699. 
 116. Bottini, Jr., supra note 76, at 603-08.  
 117. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1992).  
 118. See Standard & Poor’s Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) P 76,021 (July 8, 1991) (SEC grants Standard & Poor’s request that a seller may rely on a list of QIBs 
published by S&P’s in its Corporation Records).  See also Sellers May Rely on S&P List for Rule 144A Purposes, 
Staff Confirms, 23 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1095 (1991). 
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Investment Company Act of 1940, Rule 3a-7 exempts certain financings from reg-
istration and compliance with the Act if, among other requirements, the securities 
are rated “investment grade” by at least one CRA duly registered with the SEC.119
3. Arbitrage Opportunities 
Finally, banks and other financial institutions have been able to create magnifi-
cent arbitrage opportunities by dealing with highly rated structured finance prod-
ucts.  For this purpose, many banks have dealt with Synthetic CDOs, described 
supra.  Synthetic CDOs are regarded as “pure” arbitrage opportunities, because 
their tranches typically are priced at higher yields relative to other similarly rated 
fixed income investments.120  Also, Synthetic CDOs are typically easier to execute 
and administratively less burdensome than cash-funded structures because the ref-
erence assets are not actually removed from the sponsoring financial institution’s 
balance sheet.121
This advantage is particularly important in the case of bank loans, which may 
require borrower notification and consent or have other restrictions on loan sales 
that can interfere with borrower relations.  Issues related to interest rate and curren-
cy hedging are also possible to achieve by using Synthetic CDOs.122  Finally, the 
primary motivation for European banks, in particular, to issue Synthetic CDOs is to 
take advantage of the fact that the risk weightings used to determine a bank’s min-
imum capital adequacy requirements do not differentiate between various levels of 
risk.  By using Synthetic CDOs, a number of banks are able to receive a one-for-
one capital charge for the equity tranche retained by the bank.123
4. The Government Bailout Programs 
More recently, as the credit crisis unfolded, it was announced that the Treasury 
Department and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) will rely on the 
CRAs to make a determination with respect to where bailout money will be allo-
cated.124 Under the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), the 
 ________________________  
 119. The exemption will be applicable if “[s]ecurities sold by the issuer or any underwriter thereof are fixed-
income securities rated, at the time of initial sale, in one of the four highest categories assigned long-term debt or 
in an equivalent short-term category (within either of which there may be sub-categories or gradations indicating 
relative standing) by at least one nationally recognized statistical rating organization that is not an affiliated person 
of the issuer or of any person involved in the organization or operation of the issuer.”  15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000). 
 120. In other words, the rationale for Synthetic CDOs cannot be for a bank to offload its loans for regulatory 
purposes because the bank does not actually offload any loans in a Synthetic CDO (the transaction uses credit 
default swaps instead of loans).  See Standard & Poor’s, Global Cash Flow, supra note 20, at 5; see also Standard 
& Poor’s, Criteria for Rating Synthetic CDO Transactions, Structured Finance Ratings, Sept. 2003, available at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/syntheticcriteria_092004.pdf [hereinafter Criteria for 
Rating].  
 121. Alyssa Irving, Synthetic CDOs: A Growing Market for Credit Derivatives, THE FINANCIER, Mar. 22, 
2000, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/finance-insurance/721735-1.html. 
 122. Donald A. Bendernagel et. al., Credit Derivatives: Usage, Practice and Issues, 1700 PLI/CORP 283 
(2008). 
 123. Irving, supra note 121. 
 124. See generally, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, Press Release by the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, Dec.  9, 2009, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/talf.htm. 
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FRBNY will make loans, initially for up to $200 billion, to issuers of asset-backed 
securities (ABS) that have the highest investment-grade rating from at least two 
NRSROs.125  Those entities that will be eligible for TALF loans will be those with 
ABS “with a long-term credit ratings of AAA or its equivalent from two or more of 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service or Fitch Ratings (TALF-
NRSROs).”126  Under questioning from members of Congress, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke said the central bank has looked at the models of the ma-
jor rating companies, and is “comfortable they can rate securities eligible for the 
new program in an appropriate way.”127
Under the plan, the FRBNY will take the triple-A rated (or otherwise NRSRO 
sanctioned) ABS as collateral for loans that the issuers will ostensibly use to go out 
and make more ABS loans, which will provide the financing to make loans to con-
sumers and small businesses.128  To manage the TALF loans, FRBNY will create a 
SPV.  The SPV will then buy the assets securing TALF loans.  The Treasury’s 
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) will buy debt issued by the SPV to 
finance the first $20 billion of assets purchased and if more than $20 billion in as-
sets are bought by the SPV through TALF, FRBNY will then lend money to the 
SPV.129
The fundamental criticism of this program is that both the TALF and the TARP 
will be relying on the CRAs and on a system that appears to have serious flaws 
emanating from within.  Unfortunately, it may be that regulators do not have any 
other efficient way for making rapid determinations concerning which structured 
products are marketable. One alternative would be to have government regulators 
try to rate or to sort the products, but there may be a lack of sufficient talent to 
conduct such a massive effort in a short period of time.  On the other hand, the 
CRAs presumably are somewhat idle, particularly considering that in 2008 the is-
suances of asset-backed securities declined by approximately 82%.130  The Wall 
Street Journal recently estimated that the CRAs would make another $1 billion in 
fees rating the paper produced in the latest bailout programs.131  At least these fees 
will be paid by the issuers . . . or better said . . . the taxpayers.  
 ________________________  
 125. Barbara Kiviat, TARP Goes TALF as FRBNY Lends Against AAA ABS, Nov. 25, 2008, available at
http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2008/11/25/tarp-goes-talf-as-frbny-lends-against-aaa-abs (last visited Mar. 
5, 2010). 
 126. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Current Terms 
and Conditions, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_terms_090403.html (last visited Mar. 5, 
2010). 
 127. Ng & Rappaport, supra note 43. 
 128. The U.S. Treasury Department, The Consumer and Business Lending Initiative: A Note on Efforts to 
Address Securitization Markets and Increase Lending, Mar. 3, 2009, available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/talf_white_paper.pdf. 
 129. The U.S. Federal Reserve, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF): Frequently Asked 
Questions, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/monetary20090303a2.pdf. 
 130. Ralph MacDonald, III et. al., The Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility 
(“TALF”)—Expanding New Credit for Consumers and Businesses, Jones Day Commentaries, Mar. 2009, availa-
ble at http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S6069 (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
 131. Henry Blodget, Lousy Rating Agencies To Make $1 Billion Rating Bailout Debt, THE BUS. INSIDER,
Mar. 20, 2009, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-lousy-rating-agencies-to-make-1-
billion-on-bailout-2009-3 (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
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V. CASES AGAINST THE RATING AGENCIES
Having identified the principal flaws with the CRAs and the typical ratings 
process conducted for RMBS and CDOs, we will now turn to the judicial liability 
that CRAs have traditionally faced and the innovative claims that are being brought 
as a result of the credit crisis.  
A. First Amendment Defenses 
Most of the past cases brought against CRAs have failed on the basis of the ar-
gument that they are members of the press and that their ratings are protected under 
the heightened actual malice standard.132  In New York Times v. Sullivan, judicial 
activism with respect to the regulation of the press was severely restricted, as a 
lawsuit brought against the media would have to pass the actual malice standard.133
In that landmark case, Justice Brennan articulated his famous phrase concerning 
debate on public issues, considering that it “should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open.”134   The traditional First Amendment defense brought by CRAs, how-
ever, may be weakening.  
1. Solicited vs. Unsolicited Ratings 
In one high-profile case dealing directly with CRAs, Jefferson County School 
District v. Moody’s Investment Services, Inc.,135 the court held that the First 
Amendment barred claims by the plaintiffs for intentional interference with con-
tractual relations, intentional interference with prospective contractual relations, 
and publication of an injurious falsehood.  What made this case particularly inter-
esting was the fact that the claim arose from an “unsolicited rating.”  An unsoli-
cited rating is made when the issuer does not seek the rating, but rather the CRA 
makes positive or negative buy recommendations to its subscribers.  
In this case, the plaintiff, the Jefferson County School District, had decided to 
issue bonds and had obtained positive ratings from S&P and Fitch, which caused 
the bond issue to be priced with a low interest rate. 136  However, in the past, the 
plaintiff had engaged Moody’s for previous bond issues.137  Two hours after the 
price had been set, Moody’s issued an unsolicited “negative outlook” for the new 
 ________________________  
 132. One S&P official argued at a 2005 legislative hearing, “The very notion that a bona fide publisher—
whether it be BusinessWeek, The Wall Street Journal, or S&P—can be required under the threat of penalty or other 
retribution to obtain a government license, adhere to government dictates about its policies and procedures, and/or 
submit to intrusive examinations before being permitted to disseminate its opinions to the public is inconsistent 
with core First Amendment principles.”  Rating the Rating Agencies: The State of Transparency and Competition 
on April 2, 2003: Hearing on 2990 Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Ins., and Gov’t-Sponsored Enter-
prises, 109th Cong.  (June 29, 2005) (testimony of Rita M. Bolger, Managing Director and Associate General 
Counsel, Standard and Poor’s).
 133. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 134. Id. at 254, 270. 
 135. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Inv. Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 136. Id. at 850. 
 137. Id. 
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bond issue, which caused a number of investors to get cold feet and to back out of 
their purchases.138 In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Moody’s negative 
outlook caused it an increased cost of $769,000.139 Moody’s defense was that its 
evaluation of the school district’s bonds was a constitutionally protected “opinion.”  
The court agreed and its dismissal of the claim was upheld on appeal.140
In this respect, a handful of commentators have suggested that unsolicited rat-
ings, like that issued by Moody’s in this case, and which have given CRAs tre-
mendous power and leverage in the past,141 may also serve a much more sinister 
purpose, which is to preserve their First Amendment defense.142  If the CRAs rate 
issues only when they receive payment from issuers, their ratings appear less like 
protected speech.  On the other hand, “if the agencies are publishing ‘opinions’ 
about issuers who are not paying fees, they appear to be acting more like journal-
ists.”143  The conclusion would be that if credit rating agencies never issued unsoli-
cited ratings, they would appear to be even less like financial publishers and there-
fore even less likely to be protected by free speech principles. 
It was precisely this distinction that drove another court to find that First 
Amendment protection did not apply to CRAs where the issuer requests the rating.  
In Commercial Financial Services v. Arthur Andersen,144 a case arising from the 
financial collapse of Orange County, California, the court held that the First 
Amendment does not protect CRAs from liability for alleged inaccuracies when 
they were asked to rate investment vehicles based on information furnished by the 
company and were paid a fee by the company, since the CRA would therefore be in 
a relationship of privity with that company, and thus owed a duty of care to provide 
accurate ratings.145 The court noted a “crucial distinction” between the suit before 
it and the Jefferson County case, because Jefferson County had paid no fee to the 
CRA as the rating was unsolicited.  
The court highlighted the distinction as follows: “If a journalist wrote an article 
for a newspaper about the bonds, the First Amendment would presumably apply, 
but if [a company] hired that journalist to write a company report about the bonds, 
 ________________________  
 138. Id.
 139. Id. at 851. 
 140. Id. at 861.  Moody’s was separately fined $195,000 in 2001 for obstructing justice by destroying doc-
uments in the investigation.  See Alec Klein, Credit Raters’ Power Leads to Abuses, Some Borrowers Say, WASH.
POST, Nov. 24, 2004, at A01. 
 141. One of the most famous quotes regarding ratings is the statement made by the New York Times col-
umnist Thomas Friedman who said: “There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There’s the 
United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, 
and Moody’s can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not clear sometimes who’s more 
powerful.”  Interview with Jim Lehrer (PBS Broad. Feb. 13, 1996).
 142. See generally, Emily Donahue, SEC Report and Recent Class Action Spell Trouble for Rating Agen-
cies, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12, 68 (2008); see also, Theresa Nagy, Credit Rating Agencies and the First Amend-
ment: Applying Constitutional Journalistic Protections to Subprime Mortgage Litigation, 94 MINN. L. REV. 140 
(2009). 
 143. Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, Univ. of San 
Diego School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 07-46, May 2006, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257 [hereinafter Partnoy, Gatekeepers]. 
 144. Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 94 P.3d 106 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004). 
 145. Id. at 109. 
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a different standard would apply.”146 Hence, at least one chink in the CRAs’ armor 
may have fallen, as in the future it may be possible that CRAs will not be able to 
rely on the First Amendment defense when issuing unsolicited ratings.  
In any case, plaintiffs also have the possibility of imputing liability if they can 
demonstrate actual malice.  Still, no case brought thus far has dealt with the degree 
to which First Amendment protections will prevent federal or state regulators from 
enforcing enacted regulations.147  It is possible that this issue will be litigated in the 
near future as the likelihood of sterner regulation of CRAs gains popularity. 
2. Regulation of Commercial Speech 
In the years following the landmark Sullivan case mentioned above, First 
Amendment rights have been further defined and narrowed over time.  In particu-
lar, the Supreme Court has made it clear that commercial speech can be regulated 
to the extent that it is false or misleading.148  In fact, the regulation of false or mis-
leading statements is the essence of the Securities laws and, in particular, is the 
characteristic that makes Rule 10b-5 claims possible.149  In previous lawsuits, how-
ever, the CRAs have alleged that they are covered by the blanket protection of the 
First Amendment and that regulation of the content of their ratings would amount 
to a constitutional violation.  But the question is, can CRAs really be compared to 
journalists,150 or are they really more analogous to financial advisors or to the issu-
ers themselves when publishing prospectuses to sell securities? 
During the fallout from Enron’s collapse, a number of lawsuits were brought 
against the CRAs, most of which were wholly unsuccessful. In the events leading 
up to Newby v. Enron Corp.,151 a public entity entered into a series of transactions 
with Enron whereby it lent Enron some $220 million.  Shortly thereafter, Enron 
stopped making payments and filed for bankruptcy.  In bringing the suit, the plain-
tiff claimed that S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch had failed to communicate information 
about Enron’s creditworthiness accurately.  In particular, the plaintiff claimed that 
at the time of the transaction between it and Enron, all three of the CRAs had rated 
Enron’s debt as investment grade. 
In its analysis, the court first set forth the proposition that the First Amendment 
defense was “qualified” and not absolute given the nature of the information re-
 ________________________  
 146. Id.
 147. See Larry P. Ellsworth & Keith V. Porapaiboon, Credit Rating Agencies in the Spotlight, A New Ca-
sualty of the Mortgage Meltdown,18 No. 4 BUS. L. TODAY, March-April 2009. 
 148. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 149. “Rule 10b-5 -- Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices.  It shall be unlawful for any 
person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, a. To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, b. To 
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or c. To engage in 
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”  Rule 10b-5, Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
 150. Frank Partnoy suggests that the evidence indicates “that financial market participants do not believe 
that credit ratings are merely the opinions of journalists . . . if they did, Moody’s shares would be worth $3 billion, 
not $15 billion.”  See Partnoy, Gatekeepers, supra note 143. 
 151. Newby v. Enron Corp., 511 F. Supp. 2d 742, 809 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
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ported by the CRAs.  In reaching its decision, the bench was split and refused to 
exercise the blanket First Amendment protection that had been applied by courts in 
the past.  Further, the court noted that it would require that the defendant meet the 
heightened standard of pleading its First Amendment defense.152  Ultimately, how-
ever, the court dismissed the First Amendment claim. 
With respect to the negligent representation claims, the court painstakingly 
analyzed past case law, law journal articles, and current regulation.  The court was 
forced to find no liability on the misrepresentation claim, but it did go on to quote a 
senate committee report stating the following: “It is difficult not to wonder whether 
lack of accountability-the agencies’ practical immunity to lawsuits and nonexistent 
regulatory oversight—is a major problem.”153
Nevertheless, what is most important from Newby v. Enron seems to be the fact 
that it clearly opens the door for the imposition of future regulation of CRAs.  Now 
there is at least some precedent to indicate that CRAs can, and very well may, be 
regulated in the future in the same manner as other vendors of corporate speech 
(that is not entitled to absolute First Amendment protection).154
B. Litigation Arising from the “Financial Crisis”
In May 2008, the New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund brought suit against a 
number of participants associated with the “HarborView Mortgage Loan Trusts.”155
The suit was brought against issuers, investment banks, and the CRAs related to 
the purchase of Mortgage Loan Pass-Through Certificates, described as “the quin-
tessential mortgage-backed securities.”156
The complaint alleged that the rating agencies “failed to do the due diligence 
required under the Securities Act”157 and that the “Rating Agencies assigned inac-
curate, inappropriate and inflated values and ratings to the Certificates.”158  The 
complaint also alleged a conflict of interest that exists between the investment 
banks and the rating agencies and describes a process known as “ratings shopping.”  
Similarly, as described earlier in this analysis, the plaintiffs in this case, allege that 
investment banks work together with the rating agencies to obtain the desired rat-
 ________________________  
 152. “This Court will not assume blanket protection for the Credit Agency ratings, but will consider any 
First Amendment protection for credit rating reports as qualified and will scrutinize the facts alleged according to 
standards and heightened plead.”  Newby, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 819. 
 153. Id. at 817 (quoting The Staff to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Financial Oversight of 
Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector Watchdogs, Oct. 8, 2002). 
 154. Partnoy, Gatekeepers, supra note 143. 
 155. The case was originally filed in the New York Supreme Court and was removed to federal court in 
Manhattan.  The district court denied a motion to remand the case back to state court, but ruled that the issue of 
whether Section 22 of the 1933 Securities Act, which embodies the statute’s anti-removal provision and conflicts 
with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, was a first impression case and would allow immediate appeal.  The 
plaintiff has since then filed an appeal. 
 156. Verified Complaint, N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund, v. Harborview Mortg. Loan Trust, 2008 WL 
2517997 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2008).  
 157. Id.  Particularly as required by Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933, and by including 
material misstatements and omissions in the Registration Statement and Prospectuses in violation of Sections 11, 
12 and 15 of the Securities Act. 
 158. Id.
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ing.159 That is, “the process involves extended consultations between the agency 
and its client . . . obtaining a rating is a collaborative process.”160  An issuer unhap-
py with the proposed rating offered by one CRA, and with the potential to move to 
another rating agency, will simply move on to another agency to see if it could get 
a better rating.  The claim is that such practices led to inflated ratings, which in turn 
led to a substantial decline in the value of the certificates.161
Similarly, on July 11, 2008, an asset manager filed an action in the New York 
State Supreme Court against a number of defendants, including several CRAs.  The 
plaintiff in Oddo Asset Management v. Barclays Bank PLC, claimed that its pur-
chase of two structured investment vehicles, or “SIV-Lites,” suffered “losses as a 
result of violations of law by those who created, managed, arranged, and issued 
credit ratings for those investments.”162  The plaintiff alleges various common law 
causes of action against the defendants. 163  The central allegation against the CRAs 
is that they aided and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty by the collateral managers 
of the two structured vehicles by falsely confirming the credit ratings it had pre-
viously given those investments.164
1. Securities Class Actions 
Shareholders of the CRAs themselves have also begun to file class action law-
suits.  This may imply that shareholders, too, are becoming more wary of the CRAs 
and are looking for innovative ways of getting around the traditional CRA de-
fenses.  In Teamsters Local 292 Pension Trust Fund v. Moody´s,165 filed on Sep-
tember 26, 2007, the plaintiff alleged that as housing prices began to decline caus-
ing a higher than expected delinquency ratio in subprime mortgages, Moody’s 
failed to disclose that it assigned “excessively high” ratings to securities backed by 
subprime mortgages.166  The plaintiff class also made a series of other claims 
against Moody’s, including that it failed to properly handle conflicts of interest, 
duly disclose its ratings methodology, and to inform its shareholders of Moody’s 
dependence on structured finance-related revenues.167  Although the court found 
that the plaintiff class had properly alleged the loss causation requirement, on Feb-
ruary 19, 2009, the claim was partially dismissed for failure to properly plead the 
scienter requirement.168  Nevertheless, the court allowed the plaintiff class leave to 
 ________________________  
 159. Id.
 160. See Lowenstein, supra note 47. 
 161. In essence this is a Section 11 violation of the 1933 Securities Act. 
 162. The case was referenced in McGraw Hill’s 10-Q SEC Filing, filed on 7/30/2008.  A summary is availa-
ble at http://sec.edgar-online.com/mcgraw-hill-companies-inc/10-q-quarterly-report/2008/07/30/Section11.aspx. 
 163. Id.
 164. Id.
 165. Complaint, In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig. No. 1:07-cv-8375-SWK (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2007). 
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amend its securities fraud complaint.169  Leave to amend was granted until April 
29, 2009. 170
On July 1, 2008, the Indiana Laborers Pension Fund filed a class action lawsuit 
against Fitch.171  The lawsuit alleged that Fitch had applied lax standards and in 
some cases “no standards” in its ratings of mortgage-backed securities.172  The 
complaint claims that the high ratings led to more business from banks that in turn 
boosted earnings at Fitch, which caused the company’s stock to be artificially in-
flated.173  On October 3, 2008, however, the plaintiff filed a voluntary dismissal, 
which allows the plaintiff to refile a new claim at a later date.  
2. Derivative Claims – Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Finally, during the present crisis and in an attempt to pierce the CRAs apparent 
protective veil, a plaintiff has attempted a derivative suit against the officers and 
directors of Moody’s.174 The complaint alleges that Moody’s awarded falsely high 
ratings to mortgage-backed securities in order to win new, and to keep ongoing, 
business.175 The allegation is that this activity constituted a “breach of fiduciary 
duty, abuse of control, gross mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, unjust 
enrichment, and a violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.”176
VI. CURRENT AND FUTURE REGULATION 
A. Regulatory and Enforcement Limitations Imposed by the Credit Rating 
Reform Act of 2006 (CRARA) 
The CRARA may impose two primary limitations on current and future plain-
tiffs, regulators, and lawmakers.  The first is that the act provides that the SEC will 
have exclusive enforcement authority over any NRSRO that issues credit ratings in 
material contravention of the procedures included in its registration application.177
This may become an impediment to state authorities from taking direct action 
against the CRAs in the future.  In July 2008, for instance, the attorney general of 
 ________________________  
 169. Copy of the order is available at 
http://securities.stanford.edu/1038/MCO_01/2009218_r01o_078375.pdf. 
 170. Id.




 174. Complaint, La. Mun. Police Employees Ret. Sys. v. McDaniel, No. 1:08-cv-09323 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 
2008).  
 175. Id.
 176. See Ellsworth & Porapaiboon, supra note 147 (summarizing the allegations in In re Moody’s Corp.). 
 177. Section 15E(c)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act reads as follows: “Authority. The Commission shall 
have exclusive authority to enforce the provisions of this section in accordance with this title with respect to any 
nationally recognized statistical rating organization, if such nationally recognized statistical rating organization 
issues credit ratings in material contravention of those procedures relating to such nationally recognized statistical 
rating organization, including procedures relating to the prevention of misuse of nonpublic information and con-
flicts of interest. . . .”
25
: Triple-A Rating Stench
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2010
50 Barry Law Review Vol. 14 
Connecticut filed a lawsuit accusing the CRAs of unfair trade practices by syste-
matically giving the bonds issued by public entities lower ratings as compared to 
corporate debt.178  Although the lawsuit is still pending, commentators have already 
suggested that this action may be preempted by the fact that under CRARA the 
SEC has sole authority to enforce provisions of the act.179
The second limitation imposed by the CRARA is that the act prohibits the SEC 
or any state or local government from regulating the substance of credit ratings or 
the procedures and methodologies by which a NRSRO determines credit ratings.180
This provision may severely limit state and federal lawmakers in trying to imple-
ment regulations with respect to CRA activities.  
Nevertheless, there have been suggestions that this second provision is to be 
viewed narrowly as limiting a state’s authority to regulate only the day-to-day ac-
tivities of CRAs.  “The preemption provision should not be construed to apply to 
typical state governmental functions in which states are users of credit ratings.”181
If this is so, “states will continue to have the ability to continue to oversee their 
departments, programs, and political subdivisions with regard to debt issuance 
conditions, contract specifications, and investment standards for governmental 
funds, such as pension portfolios and financial reserves.”182
B. SEC Rules  
On February 2, 2009, the SEC implemented a series of changes.  In summary, 
the rule amendments require: (1) NRSROs to provide enhanced disclosure of per-
formance measurements, statistics and the procedures and methodologies used by 
the NRSROs in determining credit ratings for structured finance products and other 
debt securities; (2) NRSROs to make, keep and preserve additional records under 
Rule 17g-2; (3) NRSROs to make publicly available on their Web sites a random 
sample of 10% of the ratings histories of credit ratings paid for by the obligor being 
rated or by the issuer, underwriter, or sponsor of the security being rated (“issuer-
paid credit ratings”) in each class of credit ratings for which it is registered and has 
 ________________________  
 178. Connecticut v. McGraw Hill Co., No. 3:08-cv-01316-AWT (D. Conn. Aug. 29, 2008). 
 179. See Ellsworth & Porapaiboon, supra note 147. 
 180. Section 15E(c)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act reads as follows: “Limitation. The rules and regula-
tions that the Commission may prescribe pursuant to this title, as they apply to nationally recognized statistical 
rating organizations, shall be narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of this title applicable to nationally recog-
nized statistical rating organizations.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the Commission nor any 
State (or political subdivision thereof) may regulate the substance of credit ratings or the procedures and metho-
dologies by which any nationally recognized statistical rating organization determines credit ratings.”
 181. 152 CONG. REC. H7569 (2006).  According to Rep. Paul Kanjorski, a leading member of the House 
Financial Services Committee, the provision should be viewed narrowly as limiting a state’s authority to regulate 
the day-to-day activities of credit rating agencies.  The preemption provision should not be construed to apply to 
typical state governmental functions in which states are users of credit ratings.  Thus, states will continue to have 
the ability to continue to oversee their departments, programs, and political subdivisions with regard to debt is-
suance conditions, contract specifications, and investment standards for governmental funds, such as pension 
portfolios and financial reserves.  Similarly, the preemption should not be taken to apply to the regulation of insur-
ers and bank solvency standards and generic business licensing requirements normally applied to entities perform-
ing business within a state.  Id.   
 182. Id.
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issued 500 or more issuer-paid credit ratings, with each new ratings action to be 
reflected in such histories no later than six months after they are taken; and (4) 
NRSROs to furnish the SEC with an additional annual report.183
Although some of the new burdens imposed on CRAs appear to be rather inno-
vative (in particular the requirement that a sample of 10% of the ratings histories 
paid by the issuer be published on their Web sites), it remains to be seen whether 
these rules will in fact give regulators, or the public at large,184 the oversight 
needed to ensure a more transparent and honest process.  
C. New York’s Attorney General
In June 2008 Andrew Cuomo, New York’s Attorney General, struck agree-
ments with the three largest CRAs.  The idea of entering into these agreements 
rather than pursuing some other alternative was most likely to get around the 
CRARA preemption issue discussed above.185  The agreements covered some of 
the following aspects: (1) CRAs will establish a fee-for-service structure for their 
work under which they will charge a fee even if they don’t rate a product because 
the issuer withdraws; (2) CRAs will disclose information about all securitizations 
submitted for their initial review; (3) CRAs will develop criteria for the due dili-
gence information that is collected by investment banks on the mortgages compris-
ing an RMBS; (4) CRAs will perform an annual review of their RMBS businesses 
to identify practices that could compromise their independent ratings; and (5) 
CRAs will require a series of representations and warranties from investment banks 
and other financially responsible parties about the loans underlying the RMBS.186
Although the New York Attorney General’s efforts have been widely ap-
plauded, questions remain concerning the enforcement ability the Attorney General 
will have in the future if the CRAs did not comply with the agreements they have 
entered into.  Again, as mentioned above, the CRARA gives the SEC sole authority 
to enforce possible violations by CRAs registered as NRSROs.   
D. IOSCO and Global Initiatives 
IOSCO has also become more vocal about possible reform and enforcement.  
In 2008, IOSCO recommended measures to combat ratings shopping, including: 
encouraging structured finance issuers to publicly disclose all relevant information, 
so investors and other CRAs can conduct their own independent analysis; requiring 
CRAs to publicly disclose whether an issuer has made public all relevant informa-
 ________________________  
 183. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AMENDMENTS TO RULES FOR NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATIONS, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-59342.pdf. 
 184. Some have indicated that the market would self-regulate the CRAs because these institutions depend 
highly on the public’s perception of their integrity. 
 185. Aline van Duyn & Joanna Chung, Rating Agencies Agree to Change Charges, FIN. TIMES, June 3, 
2008, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto060320081915103107. 
 186. A summary of the key elements of the agreement with the CRAs can be found at the web site of the 
Office of the Attorney General for the State of New York is available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2008/jun/june5a_08.html. 
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tion about the product being issued and as a minimum; and that the CRAs provide 
clear disclosure as to how the CRA that provided a given rating is compensated 
should be mandatory.187  Interestingly, IOSCO is promoting standardized regula-
tion of CRAs worldwide.  
During the April 2009 G20 Summit in London, world leaders called for the ex-
tending of “regulatory oversight and registration” to CRAs to ensure that they 
complied with IOSCO’s code of good practice.188  Shortly before the G20 summit, 
it was decided that the IOSCO Task Force on CRAs would be converted into a 
permanent standing committee of IOSCO’s Technical Committee, which will theo-
retically allow IOSCO to keep abreast of the developments in the CRA industry 
and facilitate convergence of regulatory approaches of CRAs.189  But if lessons 
from past global regulatory initiatives serve as good precedent, the extent to which 
U.S. regulators may be willing to implement regulatory schemes for the CRAs that 
have been designed on a global scale remains doubtful.  
E. Market Proposal 
Finally, since 1999 Professor Partnoy has suggested that perhaps the key is to 
use market-based measures, such as credit spreads, for ratings rather than determi-
nations by CRAs.190  The idea comes from studies that have documented that yield 
spreads of corporate bonds start to expand as credit quality deteriorates but before a 
rating downgrade, implying that the market often leads a downgrade, thus ques-
tioning the informational value of credit ratings.191  This leads to the suggestion 
that, rather than rely on CRA ratings in financial regulation, regulators should re-
quire banks, broker-dealers and insurance firms to use credit spreads when calcu-
lating the risk in their portfolio.  However, unless we have misunderstood the 
theoretical fundamentals that underlie this suggestion, the problem would appear to 
be that most credit spreads in the corporate bond market are already determined in 
part by the credit ratings they obtain from a CRA.192  Hence, under this proposal, 
CRA ratings would still be relied upon. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Looking through the rubble of the implosion of the RMBS and CDOs markets, 
clearly not all the blame can be placed on the CRAs.  On the other hand, one would 
 ________________________  
 187. Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, Consultation Re-
port: The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Structured Finance Markets, Mar. 2008, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD263.pdf. 
 188. See London Summit – Leader’s Statement, Apr. 2, 2009, available at 
http://www.londonsummit.gov.uk/resources/en/news/15766232/communique-020409. 
 189. IOSCO Update on Credit Rating Agencies Oversight, Madrid, Mar. 12, 2009, available at
http://www.fsa.go.jp/inter/ios/20090318-2/02.pdf. 
 190. Partnoy, supra note 34, at 625. 
 191. Id.
192. See Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, What Determines the Credit Spread? FRBSF Economic 
Letter, Dec. 10, 2004, available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2004/el2004-36.html. 
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be hard pressed to absolve the CRAs from all responsibility.  The CRAs primarily 
seem to have contributed to the present crisis by having helped sustain a false mar-
ket for RMBS and CDOs where things were not as they appeared.193  Furthermore, 
the process used by the CRAs in developing their ratings appears to have been 
flawed.  The CRAs conducted no due diligence and required that none be con-
ducted, they did not properly manage conflicts of interest, they took advantage of 
their oligopoly power, they failed to put in place adequate monitoring systems for 
the products they initially rated, and they failed to adequately keep and report in-
formation to regulators. 
The ratings industry, in its current form, and especially as it relates to struc-
tured products, does not merit the semi-official role the CRAs are granted by the 
SEC and other U.S. regulators, Basel II, governments worldwide, and the invest-
ment decisions of asset managers.  The overwhelming power that CRAs have been 
accorded during the past years, together with the failures that led in part to the cur-
rent financial crisis, indicate that significant reform is warranted.  Reform, over-
sight, and accountability will be required before investor confidence is to return 
and before large-scale recovery can be expected. 
Although the story of the CRAs may well be “the story of a colossal failure,”194
both U.S. courts and regulators have helped keep in place a protective mantel that 
has shielded the CRAs from liability.  Indeed, most of the litigation brought in the 
U.S. against the CRAs has been unsuccessful.  The protection afforded to CRAs 
may have diluted the ability to have any private enforcement by the investor public.  
Perhaps if a plaintiff would have come out of court with a victory against the CRAs 
some ten years ago, the CRAs would have been encouraged to reform some of their 
practices. 
Some cases decided in the wake of past scandals, such as County School Dis-
trict v. Moody’s (dealing with the aftermath of the financial collapse of Orange 
County, California) and Newby v. Enron Corp. (involving the fallout of Enron’s 
failure), analyzed above, created cracks in the defenses of the CRAs.  Now that the 
world is dealing with a widespread and massive crisis, it may be possible for plain-
tiffs to further weaken the traditional CRA defenses.  At the moment, CRAs are 
under considerable pressure coming from multiple directions, including litigants, 
shareholders, state attorneys general, investors in RMBS and CDOs, the SEC, and 
politicians, among others.  It may only require that one plaintiff be relatively suc-
cessful against a CRA before a massive wave of claims will be brought seeking 
CRA accountability and attaching liability.  
 ________________________  
 193. Ohio attorney general Marc Dann has said that the credit-ratings agencies “made the market.  Nobody 
would have been able to sell these bonds without the ratings . . . . That relationship was never disclosed to any-
body.”  Jesse Eisinger, Overrated, PORTFOLIO, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.portfolio.com/news-
markets/national-news/portfolio/2007/08/13/Moody-Ratings-Fiasco. 
 194. This statement was made in October 2008 by the Chairman of the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee.  See Amit Paley, Credit-Rating Firms Grilled Over Conflicts, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2008, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/22/AR2008102202311.html. 
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Looking towards the future, there are suggestions that private litigation could 
be one possible measure to monitor the CRAs (a form of private enforcement),195
and if so, it should be facilitated by regulators.  The door is now open to regulate 
ratings as a form of commercial speech.  The recent reforms in which the SEC has 
required the CRAs to make heightened disclosures to the investor public is a good 
start 
Ideally, improved regulatory oversight will be put in place in the near future.  
After doing so, the next step would seem to be to secure a mechanism under which 
private oversight can exist.  For this, however, private litigants must be able to 
bring successful claims against the CRAs in court.  One suggestion would be to 
reform the CRARA to create a private right of action under the Exchange Act by 
which lawsuits could be brought, much in the way Rule 10b-5 does with respect to 
issuers of securities.  By doing so, the obstacles encountered by most plaintiffs 
would be greatly diminished.  
Of course, in order to avoid lawsuits from any investor that has suffered losses 
regardless of whether it was due to a CRA failure, the jurisdictional requirements 
could be limited in a similar fashion as Rule 10b-5 claims.  The lawsuit would have 
to arise from a material misrepresentation, the defendant must have known (or have 
been reckless in not knowing) the true state of affairs of the misrepresentation, the 
plaintiff must have relied on the misrepresentation, the plaintiff must have suffered 
actual losses proximately caused by the misrepresentation, and the plaintiff must 
have suffered damages.  Finally, liability would be restricted to misstatements 
made by the CRAs in the disclosure of their ratings process and the lack of en-
forcement of their internal procedures.  Rules along these lines, upheld by jurispru-
dence, could be beneficial for both heightening a positive, substantive role for the 
CRAs and for bringing increased transparency to the capital markets.  
 ________________________  
 195. Alessandro Gullo & Isaac Lustgarten, Credit Rating Agencies: Opportunities for Legal and Regulatory 
Reform, 28 NO. 3 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 1 (2009). 
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